




Recap

 \rightarrow Class 18


- Laws of nature
- Abstract ideas
- A unified framework
- \rightarrow Class 19
 - Claim construction
 - Literal infringement



Today's agenda

 \rightarrow Infringement by equivalents

 \rightarrow Secondary liability



- → There will be products that don't meet all the limitations of the claim, but are <u>very close</u>
 - Maybe due to strategic behavior (pH = 3.95 when the claim requires 4-6)
 - Maybe due to unforeseeable technology (Velcro[®] instead of mechanical fastener)
- → Infringement by equivalents fills that gap



- → Similar role to obviousness
 - Obviousness fills in the gap when anticipation doesn't work, but the prior art is <u>very close</u>
 - Equivalents fills in the gap when literal infringement doesn't work, but the accused product is <u>very close</u>

\rightarrow Preview: the basic rules

 You still have to show infringement of every element or limitation (the allelements rule)


Infringement by equivalents

\rightarrow Preview: the basic rules

- First main question: does the defendant's product satisfy the function/way/result test?
- Does the accused structure or step perform substantially the same function, in substantially the same way, to achieve substantially the same result?

\rightarrow Preview: the basic rules

- Second main question: is there a legal reason to limit the doctrine of equivalents?
- Four common legal reasons: prosecution history estoppel; the disclosure-dedication rule; the alllimitations rule; argument-based estoppel



Winans v. Denmead (1854) → Accused product: inward-sloping section was eight-sided instead of being conical

Winans v. Denmead (1854)

→ Function/way/result test?

- Function?
- Way?
- Result?

- → This doctrine arises out of the fact that prosecution is a negotiation
- → What are an applicant's options when an examiner rejects a claim?

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 - Argue
 - Amend
 - Appeal
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
Festo v. SKKK

\rightarrow Two amendments:

- Two sealing rings, each with a lip on one side to hold out impurities
- Magnetizable sleeve

- \rightarrow Two sealing rings, with one lip each
 - Accused product: one sealing ring, with lips on both sides
 - Function?
 - Way?
 - Result?





- \rightarrow Finally, prosecution history estoppel
- \rightarrow What's the principle?

- → Finally, prosecution history estoppel
- \rightarrow What's the principle?
 - If you originally claimed something broad, but then narrowed it to get a patent, you can't go back and get the broader thing through equivalents
 - The examiner thought there was something wrong with the original claim
 - It's an end run around examination

- → Finally, prosecution history estoppel
- → What's the principle?
 - And this has little to do with the reason for the narrowing
 - Prior art
 - Written description/enablement
 - Any other reason that relates to patentability

 \rightarrow Flexible bar versus complete bar

→ Argument for a complete bar?

- \rightarrow Flexible bar versus complete bar
- → Argument for a complete bar?
 - Administrability the flexible-bar rule was unpredictable and promoted uncertainty

→ Flexible bar versus complete bar

→ Argument for a flexible bar?

- → Flexible bar versus complete bar
- → Argument for a flexible bar?
 - The prosecution history can tell us what a patent <u>doesn't mean</u>, not what it does mean
 - Just because you've surrendered some claim scope doesn't mean that you're suddenly capable of writing the perfect claim

- → New rule: to get equivalents, even after a claim was narrowed during prosecution, you have to show:
 - that the equivalent was <u>unforeseeable</u>; or
 - that the reason for the amendment was <u>tangential</u> to the equivalent you're trying to capture; or
 - "some other reason"

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→ Unforseeable technology

- mechanical fastener \rightarrow Velcro[®]
- Wright brothers' wing warping → wing flaps or ailerons

- → Tangential: Primos, Inc. v. Hunter's Specialties
 - Claim: required a "plate"
 - Amendment: added "differentially spaced" limitation
 - Accused product: used a dome instead of a "plate"
 - Court: the amendment had nothing to do with the "plate," so it was tangential

\rightarrow Preview: the basic rules

- Second main question: is there a legal reason to limit the doctrine of equivalents?
- Four common legal reasons: prosecution history estoppel; the disclosure-dedication rule; the alllimitations rule; argument-based estoppel

Infringement by equivalents

→ Disclosure-dedication rule

- Another form of prosecution-history estoppel
- Johnson & Johnston: claim required "sheet of aluminum"
- Specification: one could also use "other metals, such as stainless steel or nickel alloys"
- Court: the patentee had disclosed and dedicated non-aluminum metals to the public

→ All-limitations rule

- The doctrine of equivalents cannot apply if it would vitiate an entire claim limitation
- Freedman Seating v. American Seating: a rotatably mounted seat cannot be the equivalent of a slidably mounted seat
- Asyst v. Emtrak: an unmounted part cannot be the equivalent of a mounted part
- Novartis v. Abbott Labs: a surfactant cannot be the equivalent of a nonsurfact.

Infringement by equivalents

→ Argument-based estoppel

- An applicant who surrenders claim scope in argument before the examiner cannot regain that scope
- PODS v. Porta Stor: Applicant argued (to overcome a prior-art rejection) "As the Examiner acknowledges, the Dousset reference clearly lacks the teachings of the singular rectangular-shaped frame."
- Court: PODS cannot get a non-rectangular frame through the doctrine of equivalents

Secondary liability

35 U.S.C. § 271 — Infringement of Patent (post-AIA) * * *

(b) Whoever <u>actively induces</u> infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.

(c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United States a <u>component of a</u> <u>patented machine, manufacture, combination or</u> <u>composition, or a material or apparatus for use in</u> <u>practicing a patented process</u>, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be <u>especially</u> <u>made or especially adapted for use in an</u> <u>infringement</u> of such patent, and <u>not a staple article</u> or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.

* * *

Wallace v. Holmes (1871)


- \rightarrow Tech: a new burner for an oil lamp
- → Claim: a new oil lamp with new burner AND standard fuel reservoir, wick tube, chimney
- → Accused product: new oil lamp minus the chimney
- → Court: this is "palpable interference" with the patent rights

Wallace v. Holmes (1871)

- → How could the patentee have prevented this problem?
 - Just claim the novel burner separately
 - Today: this totally works
 - In 1871: not allowed

→ Now codified in § 271(c): Offering/selling/importing a component of a patented invention Knowing it to be especially made for infringement Not a staple article of commerce

- \rightarrow Tech: convertible tops for cars
- → Aro: makes replacement fabric parts for when the original wears out



- \rightarrow Does Ford infringe?
- → Do Ford owners infringe?
- → Does repairing Fords infringe?
- → Does Aro directly infringe?

Aro Manufacturing

- → Court: Aro is supplying a part especially made or adapted for use in the infringing product
- \rightarrow No other use
- \rightarrow So not a staple article of commerce
 - Bolts, screws, &c

- → Also: has to have knowledge of:
 - That the product it's making is especially suited for putting into Ford cars
 - That a patent covers the convertible top
 - That the use by Ford is unlicensed
- → Here: Aro had that knowledge because the patent owner had sent it a letter

Aro Manufacturing

 \rightarrow Is this a sensible rule?

→ If you make repair parts, how will you behave in light of this rule?

- \rightarrow Is this a sensible rule?
- → If you make repair parts, how will you behave in light of this rule?
 - Bury your head in the sand
 - This means patent holders have a lot of pressure to track down infringers
 - Who has lower search costs?

Global-Tech v. SEB

→ § 271(b): whoever "actively induces infringement"

→ Question: what mental state is required?

- Actual knowledge
- Willful blindness
- Recklessness
- Deliberate disregard of a known risk
- Should have known
- Negligence
- Strict liability

Global-Tech v. SEB

- → Federal Circuit: Deliberate disregard of a known risk is sufficient
- → Supreme Court: No, <u>actual knowledge</u> is required
- → However: <u>Willful blindness</u> is a form of actual knowledge
 - Requires: subjective belief that there is a high probability of a patent, and deliberate action to avoid learning about it

Global-Tech v. SEB

→ What was the inducement?

- Here: encouraging others to sell infringing deep fryers
- In general: actively and knowingly aiding and abetting

Secondary liability

- → Contributory infringement:
 - Sale of an article, with knowledge, that is not a staple article of commerce
- \rightarrow Induced infringement:
 - Aiding and abetting, with knowledge
 - Possibly active encouragement
- → After Global-Tech, the line between the two is very fine

Secondary liability

- → Follow-up question: Can you be liable for inducement if you believe the patent is invalid or not infringed?
 - Global-Tech: "[W]e now hold that induced infringement ... requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement."
 - Invalidity: ???

Secondary liability

- → Commil USA v. Cisco Systems:
 - Argued in the Supreme Court last week
 - Question: Is a good-faith belief that a patent is invalid enough to defeat inducement liability?
 - U.S. government: No; and Global-Tech should be narrowly construed
 - Court: likely to say yes



